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"On a single night in 2016, 549,928 people were experiencing
homelessness in the United States."' Of those homeless persons, 32%
(i.e., 176,357 people) were without shelter. 2 While the total number of
homeless persons decreased between 2015 and 2016, the number of
persons unsheltered increased by 3,089.3 "Florida had the second highest
share of the unsheltered homeless population in the United States, with
[9%] (15,361 people)." 4
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in
Pottinger v. City of Miami,5 condemned the employment of city
ordinances to stop homeless people from engaging in basic activities of
daily life in public areas. 6 The court ruled that "enforcement of laws that
prevent homeless individuals who have no place to go from sleeping,
lying down, eating and performing other harmless life-sustaining
activities burdens their right to travel." 7 The court reasoned that the
* City attorney & municipal prosecutor, Walla Walla, Washington, 1996-present; J.D.,
Gonzaga University School of Law, 1987; B.A., Whitman College, 1984. The author thanks
Daniel B. Heid, Patrick W. Mason, and Joseph M. Svoboda.
1. MEGHAN HENRY ET AL., U.S. DEP'T. HOUSING & URB. DEV. OFF. OF COMMUNITY PLAN.
& DEV., THE 2016 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT (AHAR) TO CONGRESS 1, 1 (2016).
California, New York, Florida, Texas, and Washington contain half of all people in the United
States experiencing homelessness. Id. at 24.
2. Id. at 8.
3. Id at 10. It should however be noted that the number of unsheltered persons decreased
by 31% (i. e., 79,500 people) between 2007 and 2016. Id.
4. Id. at 12.
5. 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
6. Id. at 1557-85.
7. Id. at 1580; see also Johnson v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d. 929, 949
(E.D. Mo. 2004).
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constitutional right to travel protects a person's right to migrate and
pursue the basic necessities of life.8 It concluded that policies and
practices which, in effect, make it impossible for homeless persons to live
in a city interfere with their pursuit of many of life's necessities and
unconstitutionally acts as a deterrent to free movement.9
Pottinger'sholding with respect to the right to travel has been rejected
by many courts.1 0 The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona
succinctly held, in Davison v. City of Tucson," that a city resolution
seeking to abate a homeless encampment did not violate the campers'
right to travel, because "they do not seek to travel anywhere; they seek
only to remain." 12 However, others, relying on Pottinger, have
recognized that "[s]weeping ordinances prohibiting eating, sleeping,
sitting, or lying down in public may also be so broad that they violate the
right to travel if they make it impossible for homeless persons to live
within the city."' 3 This Article examines the extent to which the right to
interstate travel protects the ability of homeless persons to live where they
are unwelcome.
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL

The Articles of Confederation provided that the free inhabitants of
each State were entitled to "all privileges and immunities of free citizens
in the several States" and that "the people of each [S]tate shall have free
ingress and regress to and from any other [S]tate, and shall enjoy therein
all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties,
impositions, and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively.

8. Pottinger,810 F. Supp. at 1579-80.
9. Id. at 1580-81.
10. E.g., Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1110-11 (E.D. Cal. 2012);
Davison v. City of Tucson, 924 F. Supp. 989, 993 (D. Ariz. 1996).
11. Davison, 924 F. Supp. at 989.
12. Id. at 993; see also Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 354 (N.D. Tex. 1994)
(rejecting an assertion that the right to travel includes the right not to travel), rev'd in part, vacated

in partby Johnson v. City of Dallas, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995).
13. City of Seattle v. McConahy, 937 P.2d 1133, 1141 (Wash. Ct App. 1997); see also
Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 392-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), overruled by Tobe
v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1161-66 (Cal. 1995).
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S."14 The Constitution does not expressly mention the right to travel.'
"It has been assumed that the clause was dropped because it was so
obviously an essential part of our federal structure that it was necessarily
subsumed under more general clauses of the Constitution."' 6 It also "may
simply have been 'conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created."" 7
Supreme Court Associate Justice Bushrod Washington wrote in 1823,
while acting as a Circuit Justice in Corfield v. Coryell,' 8

.

The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in
any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional
pursuits, or otherwise . . . may be mentioned as some of the
particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly
embraced by the eneral description of privileges deemed to be
fundamental. . .
Chief Justice Roger Taney later elaborated in the Passenger Cases20
that every citizen living under our common government is entitled to free
access, not only to the nation's capital but also to its public institutions
throughout the country. 2' He explained that
[fjor all the great purposes for which the Federal government was

-

14. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 4 (1778). The common law right of
personal liberty included "the power of loco-motion, of changing situation, or removing one's
person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint,
unless by due course of law." I WLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 130, ch. 1, 1 II (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765). See also Howell v. Netherland (Va.
Gen. Ct. 1770), reprintedin THOMAS JEFFERSON, REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN THE GENERAL
COURT OF VIRGINIA 90, 92 (Charlottesville, F. Carr & Co. 1829).
Under the law of nature, all men are born free, everyone comes into the world
with a right to his own person, which includes the liberty of moving and using it

at his own will. This is what is called personal liberty, and is given him by the
author of nature, because necessary for his own sustenance.
Id.; cf MAGNA CARTA, ¶ 41 (guaranteeing merchants the right to "safely and securely go away
from England, come to England, stay in and go through England .... ) ¶ 42 (securing the right
of everyone "to leave our kingdom and to return in safety and security . . . .") (1215), reprintedin
I BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 12 (1971).

15.
16.

Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999).
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 764 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part).

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501 (quoting Guest, 383 U.S. at 758).
6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
Id. at 552.
48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
Id. at 492 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
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formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all
citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same
community, must have the right to pass and repass through every
part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States. 2 2
In Crandall v. Nevada,2 3 the Supreme Court invalidated a Nevada
capitation tax levied upon common carriers for each passenger conveyed
in or out of that state. 24 The majority in Crandall determined that
passengers ultimately paid the tax themselves, and it rejected Nevada's
attempt to limit the question to whether the tax violated the Import-Export
Clause or the Commerce Clause. 2 5 It found instead that the tax violated
rights implicit in the U.S. federal union.2 6 The CrandallCourt wrote that
the United States consists of one nation governed by a federal
government that has the right to call its citizens anywhere into service in
either the nation's capital or secondary offices throughout the country.2 7
It further recognized the federal government's need during times of war
to transport troops through and over the various States of the Union. 2 8
The Court reasoned that these rights of the federal government could not
be made dependent upon the pleasure of any State to obstruct or condition
their exercise by imposition of taxes that might bankrupt the nation,2 9 and
it went on to explain:
[I]f the government has these rights on her own account, the citizen
also has correlative rights. He has the right to come to the seat of
government to assert any claim he may have upon that government
or to transact any business he may have with it. To seek its
protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its
functions. He has a right to free access to its sea-ports, through
which all the operations of foreign trade and commerce are
conducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land offices, the revenue

22.

Id.; see also Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 460-62 (Grier, J., concurring)

(opining that one of the chief objects of the Union would fail if States could impede free passage
of persons across their borders); cf 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF

THE UNITED STATES § 1800, at 675 (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, and Company. Cambridge: Brown,
Shattuck, and Co. 1833) (stating that the purpose of U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 was to confer
upon the citizens of other states, "if one may so say, a general citizenship; and to communicate

all the privileges and immunities, which the citizens of the same state would be entitled to under
the like circumstances.").

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
Id. at 39-49.
Id. at 39-43.
Id. at 43-49.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 44.
Id.
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offices, and the courts of justice in the several States, and this right
is in its nature independent of the will of any State over whose soil
he must pass in the exercise of it.3 0

Despite recognition of a right to travel, the degree to which it received
constitutional protection was unclear. The Comity Clause in Article IV,
Section 2 of the Constitution states that "[t]he citizens of each state shall
be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states." 3 1 The Privileges and Immunities Clause in the Fourteenth

Amendment similarly provides that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States. . "3 The Supreme Court said in the Slaughter-House
Cases 33 that the privileges and immunities protected under the Articles of
Confederation, including the right of citizens of each state to "free ingress
and regress to and from any other State," and those intended under the
Comity Clause "are the same in each." 34 It ruled, however, that States are
free to regulate fundamental rights that are aspects of state citizenship,
and wrote that the sole purpose of the Comity Clause:
[w]as to declare to the several States, that whatever those rights, as
you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or
qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither
more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other
States within your jurisdiction. 3 5
30. Id.; see also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 185-86 (1941) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (opining that a citizen with the duty to render military service when called should
have the right to migrate to any part of the country they might be required to defend).

31.

U.S. CONST. art. IV,

§ 2, cl. 1. This clause has been alternatively referred to as the

Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the Comity Clause. E.g., Att'y Gen. of N.Y.

v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 920 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Privileges and Immunities
Clause"); Maldonado v. Houstoun, 177 F.R.D. 311, 327-28 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ("Comity Clause"),
aff'd, 157 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 1998). U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I is referred to as the Comity
Clause throughout this Article to more easily distinguish it for the reader from the Privileges and
Immunities Clause contained in U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

33. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
34. Id. at 75; see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 n.13 (1999); Zobel v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55, 79-80 (1982) (O'Connor, J. concurring); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 29497 (1920). The Supreme Court wrote in Wheeler, 254 U.S. at 297-98, that the Constitution fused

"

a two-fold "right of citizens of the States to reside peacefully in, and to have free ingress into and
egress from, the several States" in both their own states and in other states through comity into a
unitary principle that "one State should not deny to the citizens of other States rights given to its
own citizens ....
35. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77; cf THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison)
(arguing in favor of constitutionally vesting the federal government with exclusive authority to
adopt uniform national naturalization rules to guard against an individual state improperly

406
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The Court additionally held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment protects only those rights attached to
national citizenship. 36 One of the few rights that the Court ventured to
attribute to national citizenship was the right to free access throughout
the United States. 37 The Court did not, however, elaborate on the extent
to which national citizenship rights were constitutionally protected
because it was deemed "useless to pursue this branch of inquiry" in the
context of that case. 3 8
Early cases indicated that the federal government had only a limited
role in protection of the right to travel, but the Supreme Court consistently
reaffirmed the right itself.39 The Court rejected a challenge in Williams v.
Fears40 to a Georgia tax imposed upon emigrant agents who recruited
laborers to work out of state, however, the Court recognized that
"[u]ndoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one
place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal
liberty...." 4 1 The Supreme Court held in United States v. Wheeler4 2 that
the Comity Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not
protect against private action, but it reconfirmed that they prohibit States
from discriminatorily interfering with ingress/egress rights. 4 3 The Court
in Twining v. New Jersey" reiterated the ruling from the Slaughter-House
Cases that privileges and immunities of national citizenship are limited,
but it also recognized that they include "the right to pass freely from State
admitting and then saddling other states with unwanted immigrants, because the privileges and
immunities clause in article 4 of the Articles of Confederation must, in Madison's view,

unavoidably be construed to mean that "those who come under the denomination of free
inhabitantsof a State, although not citizens of such State, are entitled in every other State to all
the privileges of free citizens of the latter; that is, to greater privileges than they may be entitled
to in their own State .... "), reprintedin ALEXANDER HAMILTON ET. AL., THE FEDERALIST 285-86

(Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961).
36.

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 73-74.

37.
38.

Id. at 79.
Id. at 80.

39.

See, e.g., Wheeler, 254 U.S. at 297-300 (holding that right to free travel is protected

against only state action and actions that directly burden performance of governmental functions
by the United States or its citizens growing out of those functions).
40. 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
41. Id. at 274, 278.
42. 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
43. Id. at 296-98. In United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-60 (1966), the Supreme
Court limited and departed from Wheeler's holding that the right to free travel was not protected
against private action. It later wrote in Saenz v. Roe that "the right is so important that it is
'assertable against private interference as well as governmental action ... a virtually unconditional

personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all."' Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999)
(quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring), overruled on
other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974)).
44. 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 2-6
(1964).
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to State. 4 s
However, the precise source of the right to travel was unclear.
Williams indicated that it is a liberty interest secured "by the Fourteenth
Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution." 46 Wheeler and
other cases traced the right to the Comity Clause. 4 7 The Slaughter-House
Cases opined that the right to free interstate passage is an attribute of
national citizenship protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 4 8
Crandallsuggested that the right is derived directly from the structure of
government adopted by the United States. 4 9 Concurring opinions in both
Crandall and the Passenger Cases proposed vindication of the right
through the Commerce Clause.o
45. Id. at 97.
46. Williams, 179 U.S. at 274. Later cases indicate that this liberty interest "is protected by
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S.

412, 418-19 (1981); see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1999) (plurality
opinion) (stating that the "right to remove from one place to another according to inclination" is
"'an attribute of personal liberty' protected by the Constitution" (citing Williams, 179 U.S. at

274)); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 669-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Guest, 383 U.S. at 769-70 (Harlan,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); cf Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-14

(1964) (travel abroad); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (same); but cf Haig v. Agee,
453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981) (stating that "[t]he Court has made it plain that the freedom to travel
outside the United States must be distinguished from the right to travel within the United States");
Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.46 (1977) (contrasting the right to interstate travel from the
"right" of international travel and indicating that only the latter "has been considered to be no
more than an aspect of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment").

47.

Wheeler, 254 U.S. at 294-98; Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870)

(writing that the Comity Clause, "unmistakably secures and protects the right of a citizen of one
State to pass into any other State of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce,

trade, or business without molestation. . . ."); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868)
(writing that the Comity Clause protects the rights of citizens of each State to "free ingress into
other States, and egress from them. . . ."), overruledon othergrounds by United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 543-53 (1944). This source is reconfirmed in later

cases. E.g., Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501-02; Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 79-81 (1982) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).

48. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74, 79 (1872); see also id. at 95-98
(Field, J., dissenting); id. at 112-19 (Bradley, J., dissenting). The national citizenship approach
has been repeated in subsequent opinions. See, e.g., Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501-04; Oregon v.

Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 285-86 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178-81 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); Edwards, 314 U.S.
at 183-84 (Jackson, J., concurring); Twining, 211 U.S. at 96-97.

49. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35,44 (1867); see also Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). This theory of a more generalized independent inferred
right has been mentioned many times in more recent opinions. E.g., Att'y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-

Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 (1985) (plurality opinion); Zobel, 457 U.S. at 67 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969), overruled on other grounds by
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974); Guest, 383 U.S. at 757-58, 759-60 n.17.
50. Crandall, 73 U.S. at 49 (Clifford, J., dissenting); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 464
(Grier, J., concurring). This view was animated by Edwards, 314 U.S. at 172-74. But see New

York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 136-37 (1837) (questioning how the Commerce Clause could

408
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Early authorities also left doubt whether the poor enjoyed a right to
travel.5 ' That question was resolved in Edwards v. California.5 The
majority in Edwards struck a statute making it a crime to transport an
indigent person into California on the basis that it erected an
unconstitutional barrier to interstate commerce. 5 3 It explained that no
State can isolate itself by closing its borders to problems common to all
because our Constitution is framed upon the theory that we sink or swim
together and benefit in the long-term from unity rather than division. 54
The majority decision was based upon Commerce Clause considerations
rather than civil rights, but it did express concern that "indigent nonresidents who are the real victims of the statute are deprived of the
opportunity to exert political pressure upon the California legislature in
order to obtain a change in policy." 5 5 The Court also expressly dispelled
the notion that the right to interstate travel contains a public morality
based pauper exception, writing that "[p]overty and immorality are not
synonymous." 5 6
Writing for Justices Black, Murphy and himself, Justice William 0.
Douglas offered a more robust perspective in Edwards that the right of
persons to move freely between States is entitled to greater protection
than the movement of commerce across state lines.57 He emphasized that
the right to move freely from State to State is an attribute of national
citizenship.5 8 He further opined that the right to free ingress and egress
rises to higher constitutional dignity than a state citizenship right, and is,
therefore, afforded protection against more than just residency based
discrimination. 5 9 Justice Douglas wrote that it would contravene the
conception of national unity to allow States to restrict poor people's right
of free movement, and he went on to remark:

apply to persons).
51. Frank L. Dunlap, Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: Power ofStates to Prevent Entry of
Paupersfrom Other States, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 603, 605-06, 610 (1938); see, e.g., Passenger

Cases, 48 U.S. at 425-26 (Wayne, J., concurring), 463 (Grier, J. concurring), 465-70 (Taney,
C.J., dissenting), 524 (Woodbury, J., dissenting); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539,
625 (1842); Miln, 36 U.S. at 133-43; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. 4,

§

1, 1 Stat. 4 (1778)

(excepting "paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice" from the right of free ingress and
regress between States).

52.
53.

Edwards, 314 U.S. at 176-77 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 172-74.

54. Id. at 173-74. The proposition that the States "sink or swim together" under the U.S.
system of government originates from an opinion authored for the Court by Justice Benjamin

Cardozo
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

in Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
Edwards, 314 U.S. at 174.
Id. at 177.
Id. (Douglas, J. concurring).
Id. at 178-81.
Id. at 180-81.
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It would also introduce a caste system utterly incompatible with
the spirit of our system of government. It would permit those who
were stigmatized by a State as indigents, paupers, or vagabonds to
be relegated to an inferior class of citizenship. It would prevent a
citizen because he was poor from seeking new horizons in other
States. It might thus withhold from large segments of our people
that mobility which is basic to any guarantee of freedom of
opportunity. The result would be a substantial dilution of the rights
of national citizenship, a serious impairment of the principles of
equality. 60
Justice Robert Jackson agreed with Justice Douglas in Edwards that
the ability to migrate between States is an aspect of national citizenship,
but he commented that the right is not an unlimited one.61 Poverty was
not, however, a basis upon which Justice Jackson believed the right could
be limited.62 He wrote that "' [i]ndigence' in itself is neither a source of
rights nor a basis for denying them." 63 Justice Jackson opined:
Any measure which would divide our citizenry on the basis of
property into one class free to move from state to state and another
class that is poverty-bound to the place where it has suffered
misfortune is not only at war with the habit and custom by which
our country has expanded, but is also a short-sighted blow at the
security of property itself. Property can have no more dangerous,
even if unwitting, enemy than one who would make its possession
a pretext for unequal or exclusive civil rights. Where those rights
are derived from national citizenship no state may impose such a
test and whether the Congress could do so we are not called upon
to inquire. 64

The Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson6 5 struck residency based
waiting periods imposed upon qualification for welfare benefits. 6 6 it
rejected arguments that such waiting periods were needed to guard
against influxes of indigent newcomers and to protect the fiscal integrity
of state public assistance programs. 67 The Court acknowledged that a
waiting period might be well suited to discourage poor persons from
60.

Id. at 181.

61.

Id. at 184 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 419 (1981).

62.
63.
64.

Edwards, 314 U.S. at 184-85 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 184.
Id. at 185.

65.

394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruledon other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,

670-71 (1974).
66. Id. at 621-42.
67. Id. at 627-29.

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OFIAW & PUBLIC POLICY

410

[Vol. 28

moving to a State, but it held that "the purpose of inhibiting migration by
needy persons into the State is constitutionally impermissible." 68 it
further wrote that a law having no other purpose than to penalize and
thereby chill the exercise of a constitutional right is patently
unconstitutional unless it is shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest. 6 9
The Supreme Court found no need in Shapiro to identify the source
of the right to travel,7 0 because it had long before generally recognized
that all citizens have a right to freely travel "throughout the length and
breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules or regulations which
unreasonably burden or restrict this movement." 7 1 It characterized this
freedom as the fundamental right of interstate movement for purposes of
equal protection analysis, and wrote that any classification touching upon
that right would, therefore, have to survive review under a strict scrutiny
standard.7 2 The Court expressed concern that classifications based upon
residency duration would create a disfavored class of short term residents
who were "denied welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of the
families to obtain the very means to subsist-food, shelter, and other
necessities of life." 7 3 It recognized that States have a valid interest in
preserving fiscal integrity of welfare programs, but wrote that "a State
may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between
classes of citizens." 74 The Court explained that "[m]ore fundamentally, a
State may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek higher
welfare benefits than it may try to fence out indigents generally." 75
Justice Harlan complained in dissent that the Shapiro majority had
carelessly extended the compelling interest principle from the Court's
equal protection rubric to the right to travel without first analyzing its
attributes. 76 He explained that virtually every law affects important rights,
but warned that indiscriminate application of a strict scrutiny review
standard risked turning the Court into a "super-legislature." 7 7 Justice
Harlan ultimately agreed that the right to interstate travel is
fundamental.7 8 He felt however that it is important to identify the source
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
Williams,

Id. at 629.
Id. at 631, 634, 638.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 638; see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338-42 (1971); Zobel v.
457 U.S. 55, 67 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("the right to travel achieves its most

forceful expression in the context of equal protection analysis.").

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 660-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 661.
Id. at 671.
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of the right to determine whether the right has been burdened and to pick
the appropriate standard of review. 79 Justice Harlan reviewed each of the
possible sources of the right and concluded the issues in that case should
be regarded as due process questions.8 0 Analyzing the restrictions at issue
in Shapiro under a due process test, Justice Harlan concluded that their
constitutionality should be sustained, because they promoted legitimate
governmental purposes.8 ' He recognized the importance of the right to
interstate travel, but concluded that the burden imposed upon the right by
welfare residency requirements did not outweigh the governmental
interests that they protected.8 2
The Supreme Court applied Shapiro in Memorial Hospital v.
MaricopaCounty83 to invalidate a State statute that disqualified indigents
from receiving non-emergency medical care at public expense until they
had lived in a county for at least a year.8 4 It held that "[w]hat would be
unconstitutional if done directly by the State can no more readily be
accomplished by a county at the State's direction." 85 The Court
reconfirmed that the right to interstate travel is a basic constitutional
freedom which cannot be penalized by durational residency
requirements. 86 The Court additionally indicated that free travel
encompasses more than just mobility and includes the right to "migrate,
resettle, find a new job, and start a new life." 87
The statute at issue in Memorial Hospitalaffected both interstate and
intrastate migration of indigent persons.8 8 The Supreme Court rejected
the argument that this feature of the statute took it outside the purview of
Shapiro.89 It wrote, even if it drew a constitutional distinction between
intrastate and interstate travel, such a distinction would not matter in that
case, because the statute "effectively penalized" interstate migration,
albeit "under the guise of a county residence requirement." 90 The Court
acknowledged that it had not made clear what amount of impact upon
interstate travel was required to trigger strict scrutiny review under

79.
80.

Id. at 663-71.
Id. at 661-62, 666-71; see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 763-70 (1966)

(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 671-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 676-77.
415 U.S. 250 (1974).
Id at 251-70.
Id. at 256.
Id at 254-56; see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338-60 (1971) (applying

Shapiro to invalidate a durational residency requirement that restricted voting rights).
87. Mem'lHosp., 415 U.S. at 255 (quotingShapiro, 394 U.S. at 629).

88.
89.
90.

See id at 252 n.2; see also id. at 270-71 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 255-56.
Id
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Shapiro and this ambiguity had proven problematic. 9 ' It identified two
types of impermissible impacts: (1) those that deter migration, and (2)
those that penalize exercise of the right to travel. 9 2 The Court explained
that actual deterrence need not be demonstrated if a particular
classification operates to penalize interstate migration. 93 It further
explained that denial of the basic necessities of life constitutes a penalty.9 4
Justice Rehnquist expressed concern in his dissent that the majority in
Memorial Hospital had not defined the right to travel with enough
precision to provide an appropriate framework for evaluating
infringement claims. 9 5 He pointed out that the Supreme Court had not
found a constitutional violation when repulations affected interstate
movement only incidentally and remotely.9 Justice Rehnquist explained
that the barrier invalidated in Edwards was "in fact an effective and
purposeful attempt to insulate the State from indigents." 97 He noted that
the Supreme Court had recognized that not every impact constitutes a
penalty, and wrote that it seemed from prior cases "that some financial
impositions on interstate travelers have such indirect or inconsequential
impact on travel that they simply do not constitute the type of direct
purposeful barriers struck down in Edwards and Shapiro."9 8 Justice
Rehnquist criticized the majority in Memorial Hospital for leaving "us
entirely without guidance as to the proper standard to be applied." 99
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Memorial Hospitalwas one in a string
of opinions that expressed desire for better grounding of the right to
travel. 0 0 Justice O'Connor proposed in Zobel v. Williamsl0 1 that right to
travel claims should be evaluated under the Comity Clause.1 0 2 She
acknowledged that it might not address every conceivable type of
discrimination, but asserted that it "would at least begin the task of
reuniting this elusive right with the constitutional principles it
91. Id. at 256-57, 257 n.10.
92. Id. at 257.
93. See id. at 257-58; see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-41 (1971).
94. Mem'lHosp., 415 U.S. at 257-61; see also Att'y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S.
898, 907 (1986) (plurality opinion); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627-33 (1969),
overruledon other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974).
95. Mem'1Hosp., 415 U.S. at 280-86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
96. Id at 281-83.
97. Id at 283.
98. Id. at 284.
99. Id at 285.
100. See, e.g., Att'y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 920-25 (1986) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 73-81 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Mem'1
Hosp., 415 U.S. at 280-86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 66371 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
101. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
102. Id. at 78-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Justice O'Connor refers to the Comity Clause
as Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause throughout her opinion.).
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embodies."l 03 Justice O'Connor later wrote on behalf of Justices
Rehnquist, Stevens, and herself in Attorney GeneralofNew York v. SotoLopez'" that "something more than a negligible or minimal impact on
the right to travel" should be required before resorting to strict scrutiny
analysis, 05 and opined that such heightened scrutiny should be reserved
for situations touching upon the "constitutional purpose of 'maintaining
a Union rather than a mere "league of States.""' 06
In Saenz v. Roe,' 0 7 the Supreme Court finally answered the repeated
calls for a reformulated framework to use when evaluating right to travel
claims. 0 8 It explained that the right to travel embraces three different
components:
It protects [1] the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave
another State, [2] the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather.
than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second
State, and, [3] for those travelers who elect to become permanent
residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State. 0
The Court wrote that the first component (i.e., free passage) protects
the right to free interstate movement against direct impairment.11 0 Direct
impairment of interstate ingress/egress was not at issue in Saenz, and the
Court, therefore, found it did not need to identify the exact source of that
particular right."' It did, however, reconfirm that the right includes free
ingress to and egress from a State and the use of "highway facilities and
other instrumentalities of interstate commerce within the State. . . ." 12
The Court wrote that the second component to the right to travel (i.e.,
visitation equality) is derived from the Comity Clause." 3 The Court
explained that equal treatment of visitors "provides important protections
for nonresidents who enter a State whether to obtain employment, . . . to
procure medical services, . . . or even to engage in commercial shrimp

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 81.
476 U.S. 898 (1986).
Id. at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 923-24 (quoting Zobel, 457 U.S. at 73 (O'Connor, J. concurring)); cf THE

FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (remarking while arguing in favor of a national

judiciary that "[i]t may be esteemed the basis of the Union, that 'the citizens of each State shall
be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several States."'), reprinted
in ALEXANDER HAMILTONET AL., THE FEDERALIST 537 (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961).

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

526 U.S. 489 (1999).
See id. at 498-504.
Id at 500 (numbering added).
Id. at 500-01.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 500-01 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966)).
Id. at 501.
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fishing."" 4 The protection is not absolute, but it prohibits States from
discriminating against the residents of other States "where there is no
substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they
are citizens of other States."'" The Court found that the third component
of the right to travel (i.e., immigration equality) is derived from national
citizenship protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.1 6 It wrote that this aspect of the right to travel
entitles a "newly arrived citizen to the same rivileges and immunities
enjoyed by other citizens of the same State."" 7
Saenz, like Shapiro and Memorial Hospital, dealt with a state statute
that sought to restrict welfare benefits to recent immigrants. 1" The statute
provided that new arrivals were limited during their first year of residency
to the amount of benefits that they would have received from their State
of prior residency.' ' The Court wrote that this type of restriction
implicates the third component of the right to travel under its new
framework.1 20 It commented that "[n]either mere rationality nor some
intermediate standard of review should be used" to evaluate such
immigration restrictions, and held that "[t]he appropriate standard may
be more categorical than that articulated in Shapiro, . . . but it is surely no
less strict." 21 Therefore, while recognizing the legitimacy of the fiscal
interests behind the residency requirement at issue in Saenz, the Court
held that they were insufficient to sustain discrimination between
longstanding and new citizens who were otherwise equally eligible to
receive welfare benefits.1 22
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in dissent on behalf of Justice Thomas
and himself that he disagreed with the majority's recognition of the third
114.

Id. at 502 (citations omitted).

115. Id. (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)). For example, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia explained in an early case that voting is a type of privilege which
may be denied to visitors: "[Ajlthough a citizen of one state may hold lands in another, yet he
cannot interfere in those rights, which, from the very nature of society and of government, belong

exclusively to citizens of that state." Murray v. McCarty, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 393, 398 (Va. 1811)
(Cabell, J.); see also Baldwin v. Mont. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383-86 (1978)
(identifying situations where a State may treat citizens and visitors differently); Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (same).
116. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502-04.
117. Id. at 502.
118. Compare id. at 493 n. I (residency restriction at issue in Saenz), with Mem'l Hosp. v.
Maricopa, 415 U.S. 250, 252 n.2 (1974) (residency restriction at issue in Mem'1 Hosp.), and
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 622 n.2, 624 n.3, 626 n.5 (1969) (residency restriction at
issue in Shapiro), overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71

(1974).
119.
120.
121.
122.

Saenz, 526 U.S. at 493.
Id. at 502.
Id. at 504 (citation omitted).
Id at 506-07.
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component to the right to travel. 12 3 He reasoned that "[a] person is no
longer 'traveling' in any sense of the word when he finishes his journey
to a State which he plans to make his home." 2 4 He recognized that the
majority tried to clear the "underbrush" created by earlier right to travel
cases, but criticized it for not explaining how the right to travel is at all
implicated by a restriction based on residency rather than movement. 12 5
However, Chief Justice Rehnquist did agree with the majority's
clarification of the first two components of the right to travel, writing that
its opinion in that regard is "unremarkable and sound." 2 6
Saenz appears to limit the applicability of the Supreme Court's prior
right to travel cases. Chief Justice Rehnquist proclaimed that the Saenz
majority departed from "Shapiro and its progeny" and abandoned efforts
to "define what residence requirements deprive individuals of 'important
rights and benefits' or 'penalize' the right to travel."l 2 7 The majority did
not rebut the Chief Justice's contention, but it also did not expressly
disavow Shapiro.12 8 The majority's categorical reformulation of the right
to travel did however ostensibly confine the Supreme Court's prior cases
to particular subjects.1 2 9 For example, it characterized Edwards as a free
passage case and applied Shapiro in the context of immigration
equality.1 3 0 The framework adopted by Saenz and its reorganization of
prior cases indicates that Supreme Court's free passage cases should be
viewed as pertaining to that component, its visitation equality cases as
pertaining to that component, and its migration equality cases as
pertaining to that component.131 At a minimum, Saenz demonstrates a
disinclination to further muddle the right to travel by mixing and
matching concepts across topics.1 3 2
Saenz leaves the door open that other components to the right to travel
might be later recognized. 3 3 However, its reappraisal and categorical
reorganization of the right indicates that any additional component would
have to be derived from travel activity and not merely the ancillary
interests of prospective travelers.1 3 4 A Supreme Court plurality wrote in
123. Id. at 513-16 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 513.

125. Id. at 515-16.
126. Id. at 511.

127.
128.
(1969)).
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 515.
See id. at 506-07 (majority opinion) (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
See id. at 500-07.
Id. at 50(-01, 504-07.
See id. at 50-07.
See id. at 500-04.

133. Id. at 500. "The 'right to travel' discussed in our cases embraces at least three different

components." Id. (emphasis added).
134. See, e.g., Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1212-13 (10th Cir. 2013) (refusing to
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a case leading up to Saenz that "[a] state law implicates the right to travel
when it actually deters such travel, . . . when impeding travel is its primary
objective, . . . or when it uses 'any classification which serves to penalize
the exercise of that right."" 3 5 The Court in Saenz further focused inquiry
into whether an obstacle to entry has been erected, a traveler has been
saddled with an unreasonable alienage disability while visiting a State, or
a bona fide immigrant has been treated differently than an established
resident.1 3 6 Any additional components should, therefore, have to display
a similar interdependence between the interest asserted and specific
exercise of the travel right itself.' 3 7

II. POTTINGER

AND TOBE

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida recognized
in Pottingerthat the number of homeless persons in Miami had grown at
an alarming rate and presented an overwhelming problem.' 3 8 The City of
Miami responded to the problem by arresting thousands of homeless
persons on a variety of charges.1 3 9 Arrests were made for loitering,
obstructing sidewalks, and being in public parks after hours.1 4 0 Arrests
were made for sleeping in public.14 1 Arrests were made for sleeping,
sitting, or standing in public buildings.1 42 In summary, the court found
that the City had adopted policies designed to drive the homeless from
public areas and eliminate food distribution to them, and that the City had
actively searched for laws to enforce against those who were not visibly
violating any laws.1 4 3
The Pottingercourt found that the City of Miami had violated many
civil rights of homeless persons. '4 These violations included interference
separately analyze a non-resident's desire to obtain a concealed handgun license under his right
to travel); see generally Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500-04 (discussing the various interests protected by
the right to travel).

135. Att'y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986) (citations omitted).
136. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501-03.
137. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974) (rejecting an argument
that a zoning ordinance restricting land uses to single-family dwellings that violated the travel
rights of unmarried persons who might wish to reside in a city because the ordinance was not
aimed at transients).

138. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1558 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
139. Id. at 1559-60.
140. Id at 1559.
141. Id
142. Id. at 1560.
143. Id at 1561, 1566-68.
144. Id at 1554 (holding that the rights of homeless people had been violated), 1561-65
(cruel and unusual punishment), 1570-73 (unlawful seizures), 1575-77 (deprivation of procedural
due process), 1577-83 (denial of equal protection by impinging upon a fundamental right).
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with the fundamental right of homeless persons to travel.1 4 5 The court
opined that the right to travel includes freedom of intrastate movement.1 46
It reasoned based upon Shapiro and its progeny that efforts to prevent
homeless persons from performing activities that are necessities of life,
when they have nowhere else to go, penalize travel. 147 The court wrote
that "forcing homeless individuals from sheltered areas or from public
parks or streets affects a number of 'necessities of life'-for example, it
deprives them of a place to sleep, of minimal safety and of cover from
the elements." 4 8 The court further decided that "arresting them for such
harmless conduct also acts as a deterrent to their movement." 49 The court
additionally noted that evidence in the case showed that the primary
purpose behind Miami's efforts was to drive them from public areas.15 0
Therefore, the Court concluded that "whether characterized as a penalty,
a deterrent, or purposeful expulsion, enforcement of the ordinances
against the homeless when they have absolutely no place to go effectively
burdens their right to travel."'
The California Court of Appeals embraced Pottinger in Tobe v. City
of Santa Ana. 152 Tobe involved a challenge by homeless persons to a
Santa Ana ordinance that made it unlawful to camp or store personal
property in public areas. 153 The court rejected the city's argument that the
ordinance left homeless persons free to come and go as they pleased by
rhetorically asking how they could "satisfy the essential human need for
sleep under the camping ordinance?" 54 It further criticized a claim made
by the city that the homeless could sleep elsewhere by asking
"[w]here?"' 5 5 The court reasoned that the right to travel "includes the
right to live or stay where one will" and that laws designed to discourage
migration infringe on the right to travel.1 56 It found that homeless persons
were left no alternative under the anti-camping ordinance other than
leaving the city or going to jail.1 57 Relying on Pottinger,the court wrote:
"Simply put, as in some vintage oater, [homeless persons] are to clear out
of town by sunset; and that, of course, is what the ordinance is all about,
145. Id. at 1578-83.
146. Id. at 1579.
147. Id
148. Id at 1580.
149. Id
150. Id. at 1581.
151. Id.
152. See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd,
Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1161-66 (Cal. 1995).
153. Id. at 389 n.3.
154. Id. at 392.
155. Id at 393.
156. Id at 392.
157. Id.
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a blatant and unconstitutional infringement on the right to travel." 1 8
Most courts have however rejected Pottinger'sanalysis of the right to
travel. 159 The court in Joyce v. City & County of San Francisco160 wrote
that Pottingerand the California Court of Appeals' decision in Tobe may
constitute an unwarranted extension of Supreme Court precedent
regarding the right to travel.161 The court in Joyce wrote that it doubted
whether facially neutral laws should be subject to strict scrutiny simply
because they may have an impact on travel.1 6 2 The courts in Nishi v.
County ofMarin 63 and Allen v. City of Sacramento'64 further explained
that the right to travel is violated only by direct restrictions and not by
indirect or incidental impacts.1 6 5 Courts expressing skepticism about
Pottinger'sreasoning have difficulty seeing a direct correlation between
ordinances that neutrally proscribe undesirable local conditions and
exercise of the right to travel. 166 The court in Johnson v. City ofDallasl67
noted that ordinances that incidentally make it difficult to reside in a city
deter travel only "in the same sense that anti-smoking ordinances or laws
prohibiting the sale of alcohol in certain areas might deter smokers or
drinkers from migrating to particular areas having such ordinances." 68
The court in Anderson v. City ofPortland 69 similarly explained an anticamping ordinance that does not actually restrain movement may make a
city "unattractive to homeless persons, but it does not constitute an
interference with [such persons'] right to travel or freedom of movement
that rises to the level of a constitutional deprivation."170
The California Supreme Court in Tobe overruled the California Court
of Appeals' conclusion that the right to travel includes a right to live or
stay where one will.171 The court held that the right does not impose a
corresponding constitutional obligation on a city to make
158. Id. at 393.
159. See Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1111 (E.D. Cal. 2012) ("[T]he
bulk of authority has rejected or declined to follow Pottinger in cases concerning policies
designed to prevent homeless individuals from erecting shelters and/or leaving their belongings

in particular places.").
160. 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
161. Id. at 860.
162. Id at 860-61.
163. No. Cl 1-0438 PJH, 2012 WL 566408 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012).
164. 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 654 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
165. Nishi, 2012 WL 566408, at *4-5; Allen, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 671.
166. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Portland, No. 08-1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056, at *10
(D. Or. July 31, 2009); Johnson v. City of Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 354 (N.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd
in part, vacated in part, Johnson v. City of Dallas, 61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995).
167. Johnson, 860 F. Supp. at 344, rev'd in part, vacated in part, Johnson, 61 F.3d at 442.

168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 354.
No. 08-1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056 (D. Or. July 31, 2009).
Id. at*10.
Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1165 (Cal. 1995).
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accommodations available for its exercise. 17 2 The court analyzed the U.S.
Supreme Court's right to travel cases and concluded that they apply only
to direct burdens." It noted:
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court has ever
held, however, that the incidental impact on travel of a law having
a purpose other than restriction of the right to travel, and which
does not discriminate among classes of persons by penalizing the
exercise by some of the right to travel, is constitutionally
impermissible. 174
The court did not doubt that an anti-camping ordinance might have
the effect of deterring travel by persons who cannot afford other
accommodations, but is held that a nondiscriminatory ordinance "is not
constitutionally invalid because it may have an incidental impact on the
right of some persons to interstate or intrastate travel." 75 Courts that have
considered both authorities have followed the reasoning of the California
Supreme Court in Tobe rather than Pottinger.176
III. RE-EVALUATION OF POTTINGER UNDER SAENZ

Pottinger does not appear to have involved either visitation equality
or immigration equality.1 77 Claims were made that Miami had indirectly
infringed on homeless persons' right to travel by denying them the right
17
However, no complaint
to engage in life-sustaining activities in public.s
was made that non-resident or newly immigrated homeless persons had
been treated differently than long domiciled homeless persons.1 79
Visitation equality claims are limited under Saenz to those involving
unequal treatment of citizens from other States devoid of some substantial

172. Id.
173. Id. at 1162-63.
174. Id. at 1163.
175. Id. at 1164. But see id. at 1181-82 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (asserting that the primary
purpose for enforcing the ordinance at issue in that case was to drive the homeless out of public
areas and concluding that its impact therefore imposed a direct burden on the right to travel).

176. See Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1109-11 (E.D. Cal. 2012); Nishi
v. Cty. of Marin, No. CI-0438 PJH, 2012 WL 566408, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012);
Davison v. City of Tucson, 924 F. Supp. 989, 993 (D. Ariz. 1996); Allen v. City of Sacramento,
183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 654, 671-72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
177. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1578-83 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
178. Id at 1578.
179. See id. at 1555 (summarizing complaint), 1559-60 (explaining findings regarding
arrests and mishandling of homeless persons' property), 1566-73 (explaining conclusions
regarding arrests and property seizures).
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reason for the discrimination.1 8 0 Immigration equality claims are limited
under Saenz to situations where newly arrived citizens are treated
differently than established residents.' 8
The court in Pottinger did not have the benefit of the later decided
opinion in Saenz, but Saenz does undermine Pottinger's reliance on
immigration equality decisions. 1 8 2 The court in Anderson was
unpersuaded by Pottinger's reliance on the immigration equality decision
in Memorial Hospital absent a travel or residency restriction. 1 8 3 All
travelers have human needs. It does not, however, follow that the right to
travel guarantees that all essential needs will be furnished. 1 8 4 A stationary
homeless person has the same need for shelter and a place to eat, drink,
and sleep as an itinerant homeless person. However, a stationary person's
pursuit of those necessities does not involve travel. Free ingress and
egress, traveler equality, and migratory equality are not implicated. 8
Similarly, an itinerant person's right to travel is not directly impaired if
the traveler is afforded free mobility and is treated no differently than an
existing resident when visiting or moving to a new State.1 8 6 The right to
travel does not require that a traveler be given benefits superior to those
provided to established residents.1 8 7 The "travel" right departs from its
180. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501-02 (1999).
181. See id. at 502-04.
182. See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1579-80 (first applying Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969), then applying Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974)); see also Roulette
v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1447 (W.D. Wash. 1994) ("[R]ight to travel cases involving
durational residency requirements as a prerequisite to receiving public benefits and those

involving other barriers to interstate travel are factually inapposite."), affd 97 F.3d 300 (9th Cir.
1996).
183. Anderson v. City of Portland, No. 08-1447-AA, 2009 WL 2386056, at *9 (D. Or. Jul.
31, 2009); see also Allen v. City of Sacramento, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 654, 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015)
("[Tihe cases cited in Pottinger involved the grant or denial of benefits based on past residency

or duration of residency laws that barred or expressly regulated travel.").
184. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1165 (Cal. 1995) ("[A] constitutional right
does not impose on a state or governmental subdivision the obligation to provide its citizens with
the means to enjoy that right."); see also Nishi v. Cty. of Marin, No. Cl 1-0438 PJH, 2012 WL
566408, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012) ("Though the right to travel is deemed vital to the concept
of a democratic society, it is not so broad that it requires a state or governmental entity to provide

its citizens with the means to enjoy that right."); Allen, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 671 (a "City has no
constitutional obligation to provide homeless persons with accommodations to facilitate their
exercise of the right to travel.").
185. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500-04.
186. See id.; Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 277 (1993).
187. Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1977); cf Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 77
(1872) (holding that the Comity Clause guaranties "neither more nor less" than equal treatment);

Livingston v. Van Inghen, 9 Johns. 507, 577 (1812) (opinion of Kent, C.J.) ("The provision that
the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several

states . . . means only that citizens of other states shall have equal rights with our own citizens,
and not that they shall have different or greater rights."), overruled by N. River Steamboat Co. v.
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purpose when used merely as a vessel to constitutionalize a concern
having no direct affiliation with an actual travel disability.18 8
Pottinger did not, however, rely solely upon immigration equality
cases. The court additionally cited and applied Edwards and other free
passage authorities.1 89 It explained that Miami's enforcement policies
effectively banned homeless individuals from public areas and denied
them anywhere that they could legally go, and wrote that this also "has
the effect of preventing homeless people from coming into the City."1 90
It could be maintained that Saenz also limited the scope of the right to
free passage, because Saenz discussed only a right to entry and use of
highways and other instrumentalities essential for interstate travel.191
However, the Court expressly declined to further explicate upon the
source of that particular aspect of the right to travel or its scope, because
it was not at issue in Saenz. 192
The Supreme Court in Memorial Hospital avoided deciding whether
the right to interstate travel includes intrastate movement.1 9 3 It later held
in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic1 9 4 that "a purely intrastate
restriction does not implicate the right of interstate travel, even if it is
applied intentionally against travelers from other States, unless it is
applied discriminatorilyagainst them." 9 5 It may be argued based upon
Bray that the intrastate movement is a State right that is not included in
Livingston, 3 Cow. 182 (1825); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 61 (NewYork: 0. Halsted 1827) (stating that citizens who remove from one state to another "are entitled
to the privileges that persons of the same description are entitled to in the state to which the
removal is made, and to none other."); THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. BEING A
COLLECTION OF POINTs ARISING UPON THE CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES WHICH HAVE BEEN SETTLED BY JUDICIAL DECISION AND PRACTICE 385 (Philadelphia,

Abraham Small 1822) (writing that the Comity Clause had been held to mean "only, that citizens
of other States shall have equal rights with the citizens of a particular State, and not that they shall
have different, or greater rights.").

188. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1867) (asserting that the purpose behind
the right is to protect and promote the union of the States into one nation); Passenger Cases, 48

U.S. 283, 460-62 (1849) (Grier, J., concurring) (same), 492, (Taney, C.J., dissenting) (same); see
also Att'y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(same); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 767 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[T]he right to unimpeded interstate travel, regarded as a privilege and
immunity of national citizenship, was historically seen as a method of breaking down state
provincialism, and facilitating the creation of a true federal union.").

189. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1579-80 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
190. Id. at 1581.
191. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-01; see also Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health

Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 277 (1993).
192. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 489, 501.
193. See Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974).
194. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
195. Id. at 277. But see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1941) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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the right to interstate travel. 196 If characterized as an attribute of state
citizenship, any right of intrastate movement might have to rely solely
upon a State to provide and protect it absent discriminatory treatment of
non-residents.1 97 In that case, the federal remedy for non-discriminatory
State curtailment of such right would depend upon whether a restriction
is repugnant to the principles of free government secured by the
Constitution.1 98
With the exception of Bray, Supreme Court free passage cases
indicate that something more than interstate ingress and egress is
protected by the right to travel. The Court wrote in Crandallthe right
includes free access to seaports, federal courts, and other federal offices
located throughout the several States.' Access to those facilities
obviously depends upon an ability to move freely within a State after
entry. The Court in United States v. Guest200 similarly held that acts
committed in the vicinity of Athens, Georgia to intimidate minority
citizens from using highways violated their right to freely travel. 2 0 ' The
intimidation in that case consisted of criminal activities committed distant
from a border that did not stop entry but instead targeted movement of
minority citizens within the State.2 02 Saenz also suggests that the right to
interstate travel protects at least free intrastate use of highways and other
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 203
The Supreme Court has recognized a federal right to free intrastate
movement in other settings. The Court invalidated a vagrancy ordinance
for vagueness in Papachristouv. City ofJacksonville,20 ' because it both
failed to give adequate notice regarding what conduct was forbidden and
encouraged arbitrary arrests and convictions. 205 It acknowledged that
there might be walkers, strollers, wanderers, loafers, and loiterers who
were up to no good, but it explained:
The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the
amenities of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned
196. See Bray, 506 U.S. at 277.
197. See United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293-99 (1920); Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. 36, 74-75 (1872).
198. See Wheeler, 254 U.S. at 299.
199. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35,44 (1867); cf Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958)
("Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a
part of our heritage.").

200. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
201. See id. at 757-59.
202. See id at 747-48 n.I. But cf, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1970)
(emphasizing the proximity of the harassment to a state border).
203. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-01 (1999).
204. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
205. Id. at 162.
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in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten
amenities have been in part responsible for giving our people the
feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of
creativity. These amenities have dignified the right of dissent and
have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy
submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits rather
than hushed, suffocating silence. 2 0 6
Justice Stevens wrote for a plurality in City of Chicago v. MoraleS2 07
that "freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the 'liberty'
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 2 0 8
The plurality further elaborated:
We have expressly identified this "right to remove from one place
to another according to inclination" as "an attribute of personal
liberty" protected by the Constitution.... Indeed, it is apparent
that an individual's decision to remain in a public place of his
choice is as much a part of his liberty as the freedom of movement
inside frontiers that is "a part of our heritage" . . . or the right to
move "to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct"
identified in Blackstone's Commentaries.209
The Court similarly invalidated a statute for vagueness in Kolender v.
Lawson2 1 0 that required persons reasonably suspected of having
committed crimes to present credible and reliable identification upon
demand by a police officer. 2 1 1 It expressed concern that the statute
allowed someone, who the police think suspicious, but against whom they
lack probable cause of having committed a crime, to "continue to walk
the public streets 'only at the whim of any police officer' who happens to
stop that individual. ... "212 The Court additionally commented that the
statute, therefore, "implicates consideration of the constitutional right to
freedom of movement." 2 13

Free interstate passage has been described as a "virtually unqualified"
right.2 1 4 The Supreme Court wrote in Twining that "among the rights and
206. Id. at 164.
207. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
208. Id. at 53 (plurality opinion).
209. Id at 53-54 (citations omitted).
210. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
211. Id. at 355-58.
212. Id. at 358 (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965)).
213. Id.
214. Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1977). But see Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412,419
(1981) (recognizing exceptions); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184 (1941) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (same).
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privileges of National citizenship recognized by this court are the right to
pass freely from State to State."2 1 5 The free passage aspect of the right to
travel was grounded by Crandallin the correlative right that citizens have
to those the federal government has to unobstructed transportation
throughout the various States. 2 1 6 The right would, however, be potentially
meaningless if it protected only entry and exit but not some forms of
travel within a State. The right to freely access seaports, federal courts,
and other federal offices mentioned in Crandallcould easily be frustrated
if the constitutional protection afforded travel stopped at State borders. 2 17
A non-discriminatory law barring all residents and non-residents alike
from entering a non-highway area surrounding a federal courthouse could
be considered a purely intrastate restriction under Bray, but it would
directly interfere with the ability of a United States citizen to freely travel
to a constitutionally guaranteed forum to seek redress against a State that
he or she was visiting. 2 18
Whether framed as interstate or intrastate interference, a restriction
should nonetheless have to directly burden travel to implicate the free
passage aspect of the right.2 19 The Supreme Court held in Guest that the
right to travel is protected under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against a
conspiracy to violate it, but only to the extent that "the predominant
purpose of the conspiracy is to impede or prevent the exercise of the right
of interstate travel, or to oppress a person because of his exercise of that
right." 2 2 0 The Guest Court further explained that a conspiracy to rob a
traveler would not, itself, be sufficient. 2 2 1 The Supreme Court similarly
215. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 96-97 (1908), overruled on other grounds by
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 2-6 (1964); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 106
(1970).
216. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1867); see also United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 460-62 (Grier, J., concurring), 492
(Taney, C.J., dissenting) (1849).
217. See generally Crandall, 73 U.S. 44; Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 492 (Taney, C.J.,
dissenting); Edwards, 314 U.S. at 178-79 (Douglas, J., concurring) (asserting that the right to
pass and repass through the various States protects more than just an ability to access federal

offices).
218. See Crandall, 73 U.S. at 44 (opining that citizens of the United States have "a right to
free access to . .. the courts of justice in the several States . . . ."); PassengerCases, 48 U.S. at
492 (Taney, C.J., dissenting) (opining that the right to sue in a federal court sitting in another state
is one of the various provisions of the Constitution which "prove that it intended to secure the
freest intercourse between the citizens of the different States."); see also U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2,

cl. I (extending federal judicial power to controversies "between a state and citizens of another
state. . . ."); see generally Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 277 (1993)
(describing a "purely intrastate restriction").
219. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1163-64 (Cal. 1995); see also Sanchez v.
City of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1109-11 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
220. Guest, 383 U.S. at 760.
221. Id.
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held in Bray that a concerted effort to block access to abortion clinics
only incidentally affected the right to travel of women seeking abortions,
because the effort was not aimed at travel and was instead motivated by
opposition to abortion without regard to interstate travel. 222 Guest and
Bray are arguably limited by context because the civil rights statutes
under which travel claims were evaluated re uired specific intent and
thereby statutorily disabled indirect violations. 2 However, the Supreme
Court indicated outside the context of civil rights statutes in Wheeler that
only a direct burden implicates the right to travel.22 4 In addition, the Court
in Williams held a tax that only "incidentally and remotely" affected
freedom of egress from a State was permissible. 225
Supreme Court cases have identified two types of restrictions that
might unconstitutionally burden free passage: (1) de jure restrictions, and
(2) de facto restrictions. Edwards and Crandall invalidated legal
restrictions imposed directly upon exercise of the right to travel.2 2 6
Edwards involved a statute that made it illegal to bring an indigent person
into a State. 227 Crandall involved a tax upon travel activities. 2 28 Guest.
and Griffin v. Breckenridge229 condemned situations where exercise of
the right was factually impaired by intimidation and harassment. 230
Griffin dealt with allegations that conspirators "intended to drive out-ofstate civil rights workers from the State, or that they meant to deter
[minority citizens] from associating with such persons." 23' Guest
addressed allegations that minority citizens were intimidated from using
highways and other transportation instrumentalities by shootings,
beatings, killings, threats, and other acts of violence; and it held that such
harassment implicated the right to travel.23 2
The dividing line between direct and incidental burdens is not entirely
clear from Supreme Court cases, but it seems to focus on the extent to
which a restriction handicaps the ability to move between States or use
interstate travel facilities. Crandallinvalidated a tax that did not entirely
222. Bray, 506 U.S. at 274-76.
223. Id; Guest, 383 U.S. at 760.
224. See United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 299 (1920) (distinguishing Crandallon
the basis that the statute at issue "in that case was held to directly burden the performance by the

United States of its governmental functions and also to limit rights of the citizens growing out of
such functions . . ."). But cf Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178-79 (1941) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (criticizing Wheeler's analysis of Crandall).

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274-75 (1900).
Edwards, 314 U.S. at 172-74; Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 43-49 (1867).
Edwards, 314 U.S. at 171.
Crandall, 73 U.S. at 36.
403 U.S. 88 (1970).
Id. at 105-06 (1970); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966).
Griffin, 403 U.S. at 106.
Guest, 383 U.S. at 747-48 n.1, 757-59
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bar entry or exit due to fear that any allowance of state regulatory
authority could lead to imposition of other more oppressive taxes that
might totally prevent or seriously burden free travel.23 3 However, the
Court later upheld a tax upon emigrant agents in Williams, because it only
incidentally and remotely affected free passage.2 3 4 The Court appears to
draw a distinction between a direct tax upon entry and exit that made
travel in Crandalldependent upon the "pleasure of a state" and a tax on
recruiters who encouraged people in Williams to exercise their right to
travel and work out-of-state, because that indirect occupation tax left the
actual traveler "free to come and go at pleasure." 235
Bray held that efforts to block entry to an abortion clinic used by a
substantial number of interstate travelers did not violate their right to free
passage because it impacted only the immediate vicinity around the
clinics and restricted only movement within the state. 2 3 6 Guest
distinguished between purely local travel and local use of interstate travel
facilities. 23 7 Griffin held that efforts intended to drive out-of-state civil
rights workers from a State implicate the right to interstate travel.2 38
However, Guest indicated that efforts to compel residents to move out of
a state would not directly involve the right of interstate travel. 2 3 9 These
somewhat contradictory rulings can be reconciled by identifying the
traveler and the particular travel activity at issue. Griffin and Guest advise
that free passage protects unimpaired use of highways and other
instrumentalities of interstate travel. 2 4 0 Guest and Bray likewise suggest
that it does not protect purely localized travel. 2 4 ' Griffin indicates that
attempts to drive away out-of-state travelers directly involve free passage,
while Guest implies that efforts to expel non-traveling residents do not.2 4 2
Pottinger did not expressly address the impact of Miami's antihomeless campaign on interstate travelers or the use of travel facilities. 24 3
The court did, however, conclude that the harassment of homeless
persons was pervasive and purposeful. 2 44 The Court determined, based
upon arrest records and internal Miami Police Department memoranda,
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
interstate

Crandall, 73 U.S. at 46.
Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274-75 (1900).
Id. at 275; Crandall,73 U.S. at 44.
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1993).
Guest, 383 U.S. at 757 n.13 (omitting consideration of local public facilities from its
travel discussion, and instead considering interference with the use of streets and

highways only insofar as they were used in interstate commerce).

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 106 (1970).
Guest, 383 U.S. at 759 n.16.
See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105-06; Guest, 383 U.S. at 757-59.
See Bray, 506 U.S. at 276-77; Guest, 383 U.S. at 757 n.13.
See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 106; Guest, 383 U.S. at 759 n.16.
See generallyPottingerv. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1578-83 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
See id. at 1566-68.
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"that the City's primary purpose was to keep the homeless moving in
order to 'sanitize' the parks and streets" and to "drive them from public
areas." 245 While not as extreme, the conduct in Pottingerwas therefore
analogous to the harassment in Griffin and Guest that implicated the right
to travel.2 4 6 In addition, Pottinger concluded that the campaign
effectively prevented homeless people from coming into Miami.2 47
Therefore, Pottingerappears consistent with Saenz at least insofar as the
harassment deterred or expelled interstate travelers or deprived the use of
interstate transportation facilities, and such impacts can be inferred from
the sweeping nature ofthe enforcement activity directed against homeless
persons in Pottinger.2 4 8
Saenz speaks about obstacles to entry that directly impair free
interstate movement, but nowhere does it overtly limit those to
restrictions specifically targeted at travel. 2 4 9 The California Supreme
Court in Tobe left open the possibility that there may be some actions
short of imposing a direct barrier which violate the right to travel.2 50
Other courts have likewise distinguished Pottinger on the basis that
Pottinger dealt with concerted action so widespread that it effectively
banned homeless people from all public areas and left them nowhere they
could legally go. 2 5 1 The Washington State Court of Appeals indicated in
City of Seattle v. McConahy2 5 2 that laws might violate the right to travel
if they make it impossible for homeless persons to live in a city. 2 53
Sweeping restrictions that purposefully prevent homeless persons from
coming into a city by making it impossible for them to be there should
therefore still fall within the ambit of the free passage aspect of the right
to travel, because they are a no less effective obstacle to the interstate
travel of homeless persons than a physical barrier that denies entry.

245. Id. at 1567, 1581.
246. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 106 (finding that efforts to harass and drive away visiting civil
rights workers implicated their right to travel); Guest, 383 U.S. at 757-60 (finding that
intimidation and harassment meant to prevent minorities from using interstate highways
implicated the right to travel).

247. Pottinger,810 F. Supp. at 1581.
248. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-01 (1999); Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1566-68
(discussing arrest records).

249. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500-01.
250. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1164 (Cal. 1995).
251. See Nishi v. County of Marin, No. Cl 1-0438 PJH, 2012 WL 566408, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 21, 2012); Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1448 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd, 97
F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996); Allen v. City of Sacramento, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 654, 672 (Cal. Ct. App.
2015).
252. 937 P.2d 1133 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
253. Id. at 1141.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that the Constitution
protects an unenumerated personal right to interstate travel.2 54 This right
prevents states from refusing entry to impoverished persons. 25 5 It also
prohibits states from treating recently immigrated indigent persons
differently than established residents.25
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida in
Pottingerv. City ofMiami held that the right to travel protects a person's
ability to migrate and pursue the basic necessities of life.25 7 It concluded
that the right is implicated when the policies and practices of a city make
it impossible for a homeless person to live there. 258 Many courts have,
however, disagreed with Pottinger on the applicability of the right to
travel. 259 The California Supreme Court wrote in Tobe v. City of Santa
Ana that the right to travel does not include a right to live or stay where
one will.2 60 It concluded that the right to travel is implicated only by a
direct burden upon its exercise. 2 61
The Supreme Court significantly changed the framework for
analyzing right to travel claims in Saenz v. Roe. 2 62 It wrote that the right
to travel includes at least three different components: (1) free passage, (2)
visitation equality, and (3) immigration equality.2 6 3 Free passage protects
the right of persons to enter and exit States and to use highway facilities
and other interstate transportation facilities.264 Visitation equality ensures
that someone who travels in a State outside the visitor's home won't be
treated differently than an in-State resident absent some substantial
reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that the visitor is not
a resident. 265 Immigration equality protects the right of bona fide newly
immigrated citizens to be treated the same as longer established residents
of a State.26 6
Laws and enforcement policies that make it difficult for a homeless
254.
255.
256.
U.S. 250,

Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1867).
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-74 (1941).
See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-07 (1999); Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415
254, 264, 266, 269 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, 629-33, 638

(1969), overruledon other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974).

257. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1580-81 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
258. Id.
259. Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1110-11 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
260. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1165 (Cal. 1995); see also Davison v. City
of Tucson, 924 F. Supp. 989, 993 (D. Ariz. 1996).
261. Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1161-63.
262. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-07 (1999).
263. Id. at 500.
264. See id. at 500-01.
265. Id at 501-02.
266. Id at 502-07.
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person to live in a city likely do not implicate either visitation equality or
immigration equality if all homeless persons are treated the same.2 6 7
Visitation equality is implicated under Saenz only when citizens from
other States are treated less favorably than citizens of a State. 2 6 8
Immigration equality is implicated under Saenz only when newly arrived
citizens are treated differently than established residents. 2 6 9 Neither
would, therefore, require a State or governmental subdivision provide a
benefit to accommodate homeless persons that is equally denied to all.2 70
Saenz appears to limit the scope of the free passage to interstate
travel. 2 7 1 The Supreme Court held a few years earlier in Bray v.
Alexandria Women 's Health Clinic the right to interstate travel is not
implicated by a purely intrastate restriction unless it is discriminatorily
applied against travelers from other States. 2 72 The Court in Saenz
indicated that free passage protects only against erection of obstacles that
directly impair free interstate movement.2 73 Therefore, free passage
arguably does not secure a person's ability to stay in a place and protects
only a traveler's right to move. 2 7 4
Saenz did not however fully discuss the scope of the free passage
component to the right to travel because it was not at issue in that case. 2 7 5
Earlier cases indicate that free passage encompasses more than just
unimpeded ingress to and egress from a State. 27 6 The Supreme Court has
indicated in other contexts that the Constitution protects some types of
intrastate movement.2 77 In addition, the Court has held that some
intrastate barriers to free movement violate the right to interstate travel.2 7 8
It is therefore conceivable that sweeping restrictions which make it
impossible to live in a city implicate the right to travel if they
purposefully and effectively prevent homeless persons from coming into
a city. 2 7 9 A welcome mat is meaningless when the interior of a house is
plastered with "no trespassing" signs. The right to travel must at least
267. See id at 502-04.
268. See id at 501-02.
269. See id. at 502-04.
270. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1163-65 (Cal. 1995).
271. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500-01.
272. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263,277 (1993). But see Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring).
273. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501.
274. Davison v. City of Tucson, 924 F. Supp. 989, 993 (D. Ariz. 1996).
275. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 501.
276. See, e.g., Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1867).
277. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1999) (plurality opinion);
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 164 (1972).
278. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-60 (1966) (intimidation and harassment
committed within a State).

279. See City of Seattle v. McConahy, 937 P.2d 1133, 1141 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
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minimally protect the presence of a homeless traveler in the location to
which he or she has traveled. In the words of Justice Robert Jackson,
unless "citizenship of the United States means at least this much to the
citizen, then our heritage of constitutional privileges and immunities is
only a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like
a munificent bequest in a pauper's will." 2 8 0

280. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).

